In an attempt to increase credibility in its capital markets, China recently adopted new auditing standards. Consistent with increased auditor independence, we "nd that the frequency of modi"ed opinions increases nine-fold subsequent to the adoption of the new standards. However, the increase in modi"ed reports is followed by a decline in audit market share among large auditors } those with the greatest propensity to issue modi"ed reports. We conjecture that this &#ight from audit quality' results from lack of incentives to demand independent auditors. Our "ndings suggest that government regulation alone is insu$cient to create "nancial markets that foster auditor independence. 
Introduction
China has made progress in creating a viable capital market in an economy that until very recently was governed entirely by non-market forces. For example, the government recently began phasing in a new set of accounting rules that are comparable to International Accounting Standards. But despite this progress, an impediment to further advances is the lack of a reliably independent auditing profession (Cheung and Zhang, 1996; Xiang, 1998) . In an e!ort to increase auditor independence the Chinese government recently adopted a new set of auditing standards that are patterned after the International Standards on Auditing promulgated by the International Federation of Accountants. The purpose of this study is to analyze the e!ects of the new standards on auditor independence and the resultant impact on audit market concentration.
In contrast to the standards previously in e!ect, the new standards prescribe detailed auditing procedures. Penalties for violating auditing standards in China can be harsh, including revocation of the auditor's license to practice and even imprisonment. Thus, we expect the new standards to have the desired e!ect of causing auditors to act more independently. Auditors with greater independence are expected to be less willing to acquiesce to client pressure to allow substandard reporting. For example, an independent auditor is more resilient to client pressure to issue a clean audit report when a modi"ed report is appropriate. In addition, two new reporting regulations were adopted during this time, adding to the complexity of the "nancial reporting environment and hence increasing the opportunity for management misreporting. Therefore, we hypothesize that the relative frequency of modi"ed audit reports will increase subsequent to the adoption of the new auditing standards.
We also expect the new standards to impact audit market concentration. Potential penalties from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for violating auditing regulations include revoking the auditor's license to audit listed companies and even imprisonment. Because larger auditors have more clients, they have more to lose from revocation of their licenses and hence greater incentives to act independently when compared to smaller auditors (DeAngelo, 1981) . Larger auditors are also expected to make larger investments in resources that enhance audit quality such as professional education (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980) . In addition, Chinese managers are expected to be particularly averse to receiving modi"ed audit reports because they potentially draw the attention of regulators. Further, aside from government regulations that require listed companies to be audited, there are few institutional features in the Chinese capital markets that provide incentives for managers to demand independent auditors. If there is a high cost from receiving a modi"ed report and a low bene"t from receiving an independent audit, then a general increase in auditor independence will cause managers to prefer smaller, less independent auditors and avoid larger, more independent auditors. Thus, we hypothesize For example, Francis (1984) ; Simunic and Stein (1987) ; Palmrose (1988) ; Beatty (1989) ; Teoh and Wong (1993) ; Francis et al. (1998) ; Becker et al. (1998) .
IPO clients may di!erentially bene"t from less independent auditors because the government mandates that the issuance price for IPO shares is a "xed multiple of accounting earnings. Aharony et al. (1999) "nd evidence that suggests IPO "rms manage earnings to increase the IPO issue price.
There are three types of audit "rms in China during the period we examine: those a$liated with government entities (such as the Ministry of Finance), those a$liated with universities, and those a$liated with international CPA "rms through joint ventures.
that the market share of larger auditors will decline subsequent to the adoption of the new standards.
We test our hypotheses by analyzing all companies with su$cient data listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period 1993}1996. This 4-year period represents the 2 years prior and subsequent to the implementation of the new standards. We test our "rst hypothesis by performing univariate and multivariate tests comparing the relative frequency of modi"ed audit reports during the periods before and after the implementation of the new standards. We test our second hypothesis by comparing the market share of large versus small auditors before and after the adoption of the new standards.
Consistent with our "rst hypothesis, we "nd that the average relative frequency of modi"ed opinions increases nine-fold subsequent to the adoption of the new standards. Multivariate analysis "nds that this result is robust after controlling for other factors expected to impact the issuance of modi"ed opinions. As expected, we also "nd that larger auditors are more likely to issue modi"ed reports than smaller auditors. This "nding is consistent with studies using western data that suggest larger auditors are relatively more independent than smaller auditors. This is particularly interesting given that there are few features in the audit environment in China to drive this increased independence other than the threat of regulatory penalties.
Consistent with our second hypothesis we "nd that large auditors lose market share in terms of both clients and assets audited, subsequent to 1994. Compared to their average market share prior to the adoption of the new standards, large auditors lose 22% of their share of clients subsequent to 1994. This erosion in market share is primarily explained by a decline in demand for larger auditors in the IPO market. Compared to their average IPO market share prior to the adoption of the new standards, large auditors lose more than 50% of their share of IPO clients subsequent to 1994. Multivariate analysis "nds that this result is robust to controls for other factors that may in#uence IPO auditor choice. This large decline in market share among the most independent auditors is consistent with managers avoiding auditors that are more likely to issue modi"ed audit opinions.
We also "nd evidence that large auditors that are joint ventured with international CPA "rms do not su!er the decline in market share experienced by other large auditors. This is consistent with large joint venture auditors being highly independent even prior to the adoption of the new standards. Greater independence among the large joint venture auditors probably arises because they have a high proportion of clients with foreign owners. The presence of foreign shareholders provides an incentive for the international joint venture partners to act independently in order to protect their reputation in international capital markets.
Similarly, we "nd that IPO clients that are large and/or have foreign owners tend to choose larger auditors both before and after the adoption of the new standards. This is consistent with "rm characteristics and capital structure creating a clientele that demands the services of larger auditors, irrespective of the level of auditor independence. The demand for large auditors among large IPO clients and IPO clients with foreign investors may be caused by these clients having auditing requirements that only large auditors are able to meet. For example, they are likely to be more complex and geographically dispersed.
Finally, we "nd that many of our results are strongest among the government-a$liated auditors. For example, the government-a$liated auditors experience the greatest increase in modi"ed opinions after 1994, and the di!erence in modi"cation frequency between large and small auditors is widest among the government-a$liated auditors. The strong in#uence of government-a$liated auditors on our results is partially because they dominate the market, with more than 75% of the auditors and 70% of the clients. However, the largest government-a$liated auditors are also expected to face stronger incentives to behave independently in response to the new standards. The central government wishes to increase auditor independence and is grooming the largest Chinese audit "rms to someday compete with the Big 5. The high visibility of the largest government-a$liated auditors means that audit failure among this group would be particularly embarrassing to the central government and hence we expect their behavior to be more closely monitored. In addition, in the event of an audit failure, the central government is able to exert costly career-related penalties on the government agency bureaucrats that are associated with the largest government-a$liated auditors. By contrast, the small government-a$liated auditors are unlikely to face these stronger incentives for greater independence. Their small size reduces their visibility and constrained resources greatly limits the central government's ability to monitor the large number of small governmenta$liated auditors. This paper makes several contributions. Our analysis is performed in a unique experimental setting. China's newly emerging capital markets are heavily regulated and nearly void of the institutional features typically found in more market-driven economies that provide incentives for auditors to supply, and managers to demand, independent audits. Performing an archival-based analysis in such a stark setting is analogous to analytical studies and laboratory experiments that minimize the set of experimental variables in order to focus on a parsimonious set of factors. Our "ndings suggest that when the primary incentive for auditors to behave independently is the threat of government penalties for violating auditing standards, auditors will be more independent than in the absence of such regulation. However, if managers do not demand independent audits, a perverse &#ight from audit quality' accompanies the increased independence. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) argue that &the existence of the independent auditor is not the direct result of government "at'. Our results further suggest that government "at alone is not su$cient to create "nancial markets that foster auditor independence. Rather, institutional features typically found in free-market economies such as auditor litigation, majority private ownership of shares, and corporate governance mechanisms are also likely to play a crucial role in developing a successful market for independent audits.
These "ndings have policy implications for improving the e$ciency of China's capital markets. Given that China is currently on a course to become one of the world's largest economies (Lin et al., 1996) , the social welfare bene"ts of such a contribution are potentially large. In addition, our results also have implications for U.S. auditors. The only large auditors that do not lose market share from the increase in auditor independence are those a$liated with international CPA "rms } all of which are based in the U.S. While direct competition from international auditing "rms is currently prohibited in China, the government intends to gradually open up the domestic stock markets to international investors and allow competition between large Chinese auditors and the Big 5. Our results suggest that Big 5 auditors have a market advantage over local Chinese auditors among the clientele that demand high-quality audits.
Section 2 presents an overview of the Chinese audit market and our hypotheses. The data and empirical analyses are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of various robustness checks, and Section 5 summarizes our "ndings.
Background and hypothesis development

Overview of the Chinese audit market
At the turn of the century the rapid development of shareholding companies in China led to a sharp increase in the demand for external auditing. The Chinese Certi"ed Public Accounting (CPA) profession was established in 1918 and four Chinese CPA "rms, known as the Big 4, were founded in the 1920s. Many international CPA "rms such as Price Waterhouse were also practicing in China and by 1947 China had 3,356 registered CPAs. Shortly after the revolution in 1949 the role of auditing in the Chinese economy diminished signi-"cantly and "nally, after the economy was fully nationalized in 1962, auditing by public accountants was completely abolished (Gensler and Yang, 1996) . Economic reforms in 1979 resulted in decentralization of the state-owned At the end of 1996, 83 of the 90 government-a$liated auditors are a$liated with agencies under the Ministry of Finance and Audit Bureau. Six "rms are a$liated with state-owned enterprises such as Bank of Communication and Citic Enterprise Limited Company, and one other "rm is a$liated with the Sung Qingling Foundation Fund.
Of the 15% with less than 50% government ownership, 9%, 4% and 2% have government ownership of 40}49%, 30}39% 20}29%, respectively. enterprises and a rapid growth in foreign investment that once again created a demand for external audits for tax collection purposes. Partially in response to the renewed need for an auditing profession the Ministry of Finance created the Chinese Institute of Certi"ed Public Accountants (CICPA) in November 1988. The CICPA is involved in standard setting and, among other things, oversees the administration of the national uniform examination for Certi"ed Public Accountants (CPAs).
The government recognized the need for an external auditing profession after the establishment of stock enterprises and the opening of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 and 1991, respectively. As a result, the government granted permission to a select set of accounting "rms to audit public companies. Due to lack of capital, the new CPA "rms a$liated themselves with existing institutions and three types of auditing "rms emerged: governmenta$liated audit "rms, university-a$liated audit "rms, and audit "rms that are joint ventured with an international CPA "rm. The government-a$liated "rms are by far the dominant group with currently over 75% of the audit market in terms of number of clients. The large proportion of government-a$liated auditors may be partially due to the government's desire to maintain control of the economy (Hao, 1999) .
While the government currently has a regulatory framework in place for building a credible auditing profession, there are several institutional characteristics that impede the supply of, and demand for, independent audits in China. These impediments include: (1) perverse management incentives created by government ownership of listed companies; (2) a lack of corporate governance; (3) the absence of a demand for independent auditors as a signaling device in the domestic IPO market; (4) the government ownership of both audit "rms and the listed companies they audit; (5) the limited size and expertise of China's auditing profession; and (6) the absence of shareholder litigation. Each of these is discussed in turn.
Impediments to the demand for auditor independence
Perhaps the most signi"cant impediment to the demand for auditor independence in China is that government-related entities are the controlling shareholders in virtually all listed companies. Government entities e!ectively own more than 50% of the stock of 85% of the listed companies. Listed companies At the end of 1996 only 13% of Chinese listed companies were allowed to issue shares to foreign investors. These "rms must produce two sets of "nancial statements. International auditors always audit the "nancial statements for foreign investors. If the Chinese auditor is a joint venture "rm, the foreign statements are audited by the international joint venture partner.
issue three types of shares: state shares, institutional shares and individual shares. State shares are held by the state and cannot be traded, while institutional shares are held by state-owned institutions, and can only be traded in blocks in a designated market. Only the individual shares are freely traded on the stock exchanges.
Unlike individual investors, government entities are restricted in their ability to trade their shares and their main interest is not to maximize share price. Government-entity owners are essentially unlisted parent companies that often rely on the listed companies as a source of capital. Chinese listed companies must report three consecutive years of return on equity of at least 10% per year in order to raise additional capital, and companies that report three consecutive years of losses are automatically delisted by the CSRC. In addition, their controlling ownership interest means the government-entity owners are able to directly control and monitor management behavior. Therefore, government owners have strong incentives to pressure management to report favorable earnings, but little demand for independent auditing.
Unlike the majority shareholders, minority shareholders are composed of individual investors who are likely to prefer credible "nancial information and thus theoretically provide the basis for a demand for independent auditing. However, there are no corporate governance mechanisms to protect minority shareholders in China. For example, audit committees are nonexistent in China and there is no requirement that independent outside members sit on boards of directors.
In the U.S., a demand for auditor independence is also generated by factors in the IPO market. While U.S. IPO "rms tend to hire larger auditors to signal "rm value (Beatty, 1989) , this demand is generally absent in China. This is because most IPO "rms are controlled by government entities after they are listed and Chinese investors perceive that the success of the IPO and the future survival of the "rm are ensured by the controlling government entity, as opposed to the quality of the "nancial information. Controlling government entities can help boost the performance of their subsidiaries in a variety of ways, including selling them valuable assets at below market prices (South China Morning Post, April 17, 1997) . Thus, prospective investors pay little attention to the identity of the IPO auditor. An exception, however, is IPOs to foreign investors. Their underwriters always request that they hire international auditors even though the Chinese government does not require it.
As discussed subsequently, this con#ict of interest may be substantially mitigated for the large and highly visible government-a$liated auditors because the central government is likely to more closely monitor their behavior.
A second set of new standards is e!ective for "scal years beginning in 1996.
Impediments to the supply of auditor indpendence
A direct threat to the supply of independent audits in China is the widespread government ownership of both clients and their auditors. Over 70% of listed company auditors are a$liated with state agencies at the end of 1996. And, as previously noted, the controlling shareholders in virtually all listed companies are government entities. In addition, the CICPA is under the direction of the Ministry of Finance.
The Chinese CPA profession is also small and lacking in expertise. At the end of 1997 there were approximately 62,000 practicing CPAs with 1,000 licensed to audit listed companies. This is a small number compared to the demand for professional auditing services. Importantly, the audit "rms that are allowed to audit listed companies are not chosen solely based upon their expertise. The audit "rm's connection to the Ministry of Finance also plays an important role in the selection process. In addition, there are virtually no cases of shareholder litigation against Chinese auditors. Without the threat of costly shareholder litigation, auditors have less incentive to avoid audit failures, and shareholders have less incentive to discover them (Palmrose, 1988; Lys and Watts, 1994; .
Changes in the auditing environment
During 1995 the Ministry of Finance adopted a new set of auditing standards that are closely modeled after the International Standards on Auditing issued by the International Federation of Accountants. Prior to the adoption of the new standards, Chinese auditors were required to follow a set of standards mandated by the CICPA. The new standards improve upon the old standards by providing auditors with detailed auditing procedures, including audit planning procedures, sampling guidelines, standards of audit evidence, and clear guidance for audit opinion formulation.
The "rst batch of new standards is e!ective for audits beginning after December 31, 1995 and a!ects all 1995 annual reports because all Chinese listed companies have a calendar "scal year. The new standards are partitioned into three levels: (1) The Principal Auditing Standard, (2) The Speci"c Auditing Standards and Practice Statements, and (3) The Professional Guidelines (Gensler and Yang, 1996) . The "rst level provides a general framework, including an overview of the Standards of Field Work and Reporting. The second level
The Chinese auditing standards allow for the issuance of unquali"ed, quali"ed, disclaimer and adverse opinions.
Consistent with the new accounting rules increasing the probability of misreporting, at least eight modi"ed audit reports were issued relating to these new reporting regulations during 1995.
consists of seven Speci"c Auditing Statements providing detailed guidance in implementing the Principal Auditing Standard, including a statement on Audit Reports. The Practice Statements in level two are designed to give guidance for issuing specialized audit reports. The third level is designed to provide detailed practical assistance in implementing the "rst two levels. A major di!erence between the new standards and the CICPA guidelines they replace is the inclusion of the Professional Guidelines.
The Ministry of Finance "rst established legal penalties for violating auditing standards in 1992 and in 1993 they released the Interim Regulations against Securities Frauds and the Company Law that provided more rigorous regulation of listed company auditors. The criminal statutes against auditors were "rst exercised in 1992 when the Ministry of Finance suspended the licenses of nine auditors for signing false audit reports. Then, in 1992 and 1993, two auditors were sentenced to imprisonment for violation of the criminal statutes. Thus, during the period leading up to the issuance of the new auditing standards, government regulators demonstrated that they were able and willing to impose harsh penalties on errant auditors.
Coinciding with the adoption of the new auditing standards, the CSRC also promulgated two new reporting regulations during 1995. These consisted of new disclosure rules on the content and format of annual reports issued on December 21, 1995, and a provisional regulation on accounting for consolidations issued on February 9, 1995. Prior to this latter regulation managers had a great deal of discretion in accounting for consolidations. The adoption of the new reporting rules increases the complexity of the "nancial reporting environment. Greater complexity is expected to increase the likelihood of management misreporting, either through opportunistic misstatement or due to di!erences in interpretation of the new rules.
The ewect of the changes in auditing environment on auditor independence and audit market concentration
Taken together, the adoption of the new auditing standards, the government's strict enforcement of audit regulations, and the promulgation of new reporting regulations, are all expected to impact behavior in the Chinese audit markets. The new auditing standards provide auditors with detailed rules for independent behavior and the credible threat of penalties for non-compliance provides auditors with strong incentives to follow them. Thus, we expect audit "rms to Additional examples are presented in Appendix A.
respond to the new standards by becoming more independent, where independence can be de"ned as & 2 taking an unbiased viewpoint in the performance of audit tests, the evaluation of the results, and the issuance of the audit report' (Arens and Loebecke, 1997 ). An increase in auditor independence is also consistent with increased audit &quality', where audit quality is de"ned as the probability of both detecting and reporting a breach in the "nancial statements (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . This implies that if the new standards increase independence, auditors will be less likely to succumb to management pressure to inappropriately issue clean opinions when modi"ed opinions are appropriate. In addition, the new accounting rules promulgated during 1995 provide greater complexity in the reporting environment and hence a greater probability of management misreporting. Thus, we expect an increase in the relative frequency of modi"ed opinions issued after 1994. Therefore, our "rst (alternative) hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The relative frequency of modixed opinions will increase subsequent to 1994.
When compared to smaller auditors, we expect larger Chinese auditors to have greater incentives to act independently. Because a potential penalty for violating auditing regulations is loss of the auditor's license to practice, auditors with more clients su!er larger losses if they are discovered to lack independence (DeAngelo, 1981) . In addition, larger auditors are likely to make bigger investments in resources that enhance auditor independence (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980) . For example, they typically devote more resources to professional education and are able to hire from the best universities. Thus, larger Chinese auditors are expected to be relatively more independent than their smaller counterparts.
It is also likely that Chinese managers have incentives to prefer clean audit opinions. This is because modi"ed opinions can alert the CSRC to the presence of earnings management and lead to the imposition of costly penalties. Companies with modi"ed reports must explain the nature and underlying reasons for the receipt of a modi"ed report directly to the CSRC (Chen et al., 1998) , and such disclosure can result in sanctions. For example, the receipt of a modi"ed report by Jiangsu Shansan in 1997 for improper revenue recognition resulted in an earnings restatement imposed by the CSRC and subsequent delisting. Short of delisting, modi"cations may also result in less severe penalties such as earnings restatements that threaten the ability to subsequently raise capital. There may also be political costs imposed such as closer future monitoring by the CSRC, the inability to list foreign shares in the future, and career limitations
In 1998 the stock exchanges began a$xing the letters &ST' (for special treatment) to the ticker symbols of "rms deemed to be extraordinarily risky and 10 of the 27 ST "rms as of June 1998 were identi"ed due to modi"ed reports that caught the attention of the CSRC. ST "rms must have their interim statements audited and have &circuit breakers' that halt trading when share prices move by more than 5%.
for the manager. The costliness of modi"ed opinions is also consistent with Chen et al. (1998) who "nd that modi"ed opinions are associated with stock price declines.
If managers prefer clean audit opinions and lack incentives to demand independent auditors, then an increase in independence among larger auditors will cause managers to prefer smaller, less independent auditors. Thus, we expect larger auditors to lose market share subsequent to the adoption of the new standards. Formally, our second (alternative) hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: The relative market share of larger auditors will decrease subsequent to 1994.
Analysis
Data
We collect "nancial information on the population of companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the Taiwan Economic Journal electronic database. Auditor identity and opinion type are collected from searching the Shanghai Securities News, Securities Times and China Securities. All listed companies must "le their annual audit reports and selected "nancial data with two of these three periodicals. Information on audit "rm characteristics is obtained from the CSRC, with the information con"rmed through phone conversations with the auditors where possible. To be retained in our sample, "rms must have complete "nancial and audit information to test our hypotheses. Panel A of Table 1 reports that out of the 1,327 "rm years that comprise the population of Chinese listed companies over the period 1993}1996, our sample consists of 1,286 "rm year observations. Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the types of modi"ed audit opinions in our sample. As in prior research examining modi"ed opinions (Dopuch et al., 1987; Krishnan, 1994) , our analysis attempts to focus on the opinions that are expected to re#ect negatively upon the "rm or management. In the case of Chinese "rms, these are opinions that are likely to draw the attention of regulators. Therefore, we exclude 16 modi"ed opinions that are expected to be neutral } 14 related to scope limitations and two related to post "scal-year-end events. Twelve reports regarding scope limitations are retained in the sample, as Table 1 Descriptive information on sample selection, audit opinions, number of audit "rms and number of clients China Securities. To be retained in our sample, "rms must have complete "nancial and audit information to test our hypotheses. We exclude 16 modi"ed opinions issued over the period of our analysis that are expected to be neutral } 14 related to scope limitations and two related to post "scal-year-end events.
they appear to suggest earnings management. Twenty-"ve percent of the modi"-cations involve multiple issues, while the most frequent single issue is a GAAP violation. Asset realization and scope limitations are other issues frequently raised in the modi"ed reports. The scope limitation modi"cations included in the sample usually involve management preventing the auditor access to material accounts of the auditee. Related-party transaction issues typically involve questions regarding the appropriateness of booking revenues involving a$liated companies. Panel C reports descriptive statistics on the number of auditors and their clients partitioned on auditor size and a$liation. Auditor size is based upon whether the auditor is among the 10 largest auditors in terms of assets audited. The top 10 auditors are examined separately because the Ministry of Finance is considering splitting o! the largest Chinese audit "rms to directly compete with Big 5 international audit "rms once the Chinese capital markets are fully opened to international investors. The auditors included in panel C all have at least one listed client and the government-a$liated auditors dominate the market, with more than 75% of the audit "rms and more than 70% of the clients. The total number of auditors licensed to audit listed companies is 62, 79, 85 and 105 at the end of 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996, respectively . Licensed auditors without clients are often located in remote provinces. The number of audit "rms with at least one client increases from 51 to 82, and the number of public clients increases from 182 to 514, over this period. Thus, this represents a period of substantial growth in the Chinese capital markets. Appendix B presents the names and a$liations of the top-10 auditors in our sample, along with their ranking each year.
Univariate audit opinion analysis
Panel A of Table 2 presents a univariate test of our "rst hypothesis by comparing the relative frequency of modi"ed opinions before and after the adoption of the new standards. The analysis indicates that an average of 1% of the listed companies receive modi"ed opinions prior to the adoption of the new standards, and 9% afterward. This represents a nine-fold increase and is signi"-cant at the 1% level. Thus, univariate tests support our "rst hypothesis. In addition, panel A indicates there is a jump in modi"ed opinions from 1% in 1993 and 1994, to 10% in 1995, and then a slight decline to 8% in 1996. As we will see in further analysis, the decline in 1996 may be explained by a shift in concentration of lower quality clients to less independent auditors during 1996.
Panel B of Table 2 compares the propensity of large and small auditors to issue modi"ed opinions. The average relative frequency of modi"cations is 7% and 5% among top 10 and non-top 10 auditors, respectively, with the di!erence signi"cant at the 10% level. In addition, the relative frequency of modi"ed reports is consistently higher among the larger auditors in each year examined. These results are consistent with our expectation that larger auditors are relatively more independent than smaller auditors. Panel C of Table 2 presents a descriptive analysis of modi"cations by auditor size, a$liation and year. The analysis of &All auditors' in the top rows of panel C suggests that the signi"cant increase in modi"ed opinions after 1994 is driven by the large proportion of government-a$liated auditors in the Chinese economy. The joint venture auditors show only a small increase and, while the university-a$liated auditors also show a large increase, the large number of government auditors gives them the greatest weight in the total increase. The small increase in joint venture modi"cations results from a lack of increase in Table 2 ( Two-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 5% for a t-test of di!erences in means.
Two-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 10% for a t-test of di!erences in means.
modi"cations among their top 10 auditors and is consistent with top 10 joint venture auditors being highly independent even prior to the new standards. Panel C also indicates that the government-a$liated auditors have the widest gap between the proportion of modi"cations reported by their top 10 versus non-top 10 auditors. The &1993}1996 Combined' columns show that the &modi"cation gap' between joint venture auditors is 7.7% versus 7.1%, and between university auditors is 4.2% versus 3.8%. However, the modi"cation gap between government auditors is 8.6% versus 5.1%. Finding a larger modi"cation gap between government auditors is consistent with greater political cost incentives for independence among top 10 government auditors. While central government o$cials wish to increase auditor independence, the bureaucrats in charge of the individual government agencies have incentives to reduce auditor independence in order to increase wealth in their regions or industries. Whereas the agency bureaucrats may generally succeed in reducing independence among the numerous low-pro"le small government-a$liated auditors, this is likely to be more di$cult among the highly visible top 10 auditors. The large auditors are being groomed to eventually compete with the Big 5 and audit failures among this group are likely to embarrass the central government.
Greater visibility e!ectively results in higher costs of audit failure among the large government auditors and thus is likely to result in greater central government scrutiny. When compared to their university-a$liated counterparts, government agency bureaucrats are also expected to be more vulnerable to career-related penalties imposed by the central government in the event of an audit failure.
In addition, the relative modi"cation frequencies observed in Table 2 may be in#uenced by di!erences in client and audit "rm characteristics. Thus, the next section performs multivariate tests of our "rst hypothesis in an attempt to control for these potentially omitted correlated variables.
Multivariate audit opinion analysis
Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on several client "rm characteristics expected to be associated with modi"ed opinions. The "rst 6 variables are "nancial health variables identi"ed in Dopuch et al. (1987) to be associated with modi"cations. The seventh variable, clients with foreign owners, may impact modi"cations for the reasons discussed in the previous section, and because clients issuing foreign shares tend to be of higher quality. The eighth variable, clients that are greater than or equal to three years old, is included because older clients are more likely to have exhausted the capital raised in their IPO and are therefore more susceptible to "nancial distress. In addition, older clients are more likely to be audited by larger auditors because the larger auditors entered the market earlier than the smaller auditors. Thus, client Total Assets are natural logarithm of year-end total assets. Return on equity is net income over year-end total owners' equity. Current asset/current liabilities is year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities.
Total long-term debt/total equity is year-end total long-term debt divided by year-end total shareholders' equity.
Receivable/total assets is year-end accounts receivables divided by year-end total assets. Inventory/total assets is year-end inventory divided by year-end total assets. Clients with foreign owners is a dummy equal to 1 if the "rm has foreign-owned shares outstanding.
Clients 53 years old is a dummy equal to 1 if the "rm has been listed for 3 years or more. Top 10 auditors (based on client's total assets) is a dummy equal to 1 if the auditor is a top 10 auditor based on combined client total assets that year, and zero otherwise.
Auditors with 55% of Market is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor has 5% or more of market share based on client's total assets, and zero otherwise.
Joint venture auditor is a dummy equal to 1 if the audit "rm is a joint venture with a Big 5 auditor or other international auditor, and zero otherwise.
University-a$liated auditor is a dummy and is equal to 1 if the audit "rm is a$liated with a university or research institute, and zero otherwise.
Government-a$liated auditor is a dummy and is equal to 1 if the audit "rm is a$liated with a government agency, and zero otherwise.
p-values are from t-tests for means, and Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests for medians. Two-tailed signi"cance at the 5% level. Two-tailed signi"cance at the 1% level. Two-tailed signi"cance at the 10% level.
We dichotomize the age variable because the distribution of modi"cations across age is non-linear. Greater than or equal to three years is chosen because the frequency of modi"cations jumps from 6% to 15% at this cut-o!. age may explain why larger auditors issue a higher proportion of modi"cations.
Panel A reports that clients receiving modi"ed reports tend to be larger, less pro"table, have lower current ratios, and are older. This is not surprising since companies in poor health are more likely to merit modi"ed reports. In addition, because larger companies are more visible to regulators, auditors are likely to be more careful about correctly issuing modi"ed reports to those companies. The higher modi"cation rate among older "rms is consistent with these "rms being in relatively poorer "nancial health.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the auditor characteristics included in our multivariate analysis. The "rst two rows consider di!erent measures of auditor size: the top 10 largest auditors in terms of assets audited, and auditors that audit at least 5% of the market in terms of assets. Both measures indicate that larger auditors tend to report a signi"cantly higher proportion of modi"ed opinions. Panel B also reports that the proportion of modi"ed versus clean opinions is not signi"cantly di!erent among any of the auditor a$liations. Table 4 presents two logit regressions testing our "rst hypothesis. The dependent variable is coded one if the "rm receives a modi"ed opinion and zero otherwise. The independent variables include a dummy indicating whether the audit opinion is issued after 1994 and a positive coe$cient on this dummy is The results "nd that the coe$cient on the &after 1994' dummy is signi"cantly positive at the 1% level in each regression. This indicates that there are signi"cantly more modi"ed opinions issued subsequent to 1994, even after controlling for other factors that may lead to modi"cations. The coe$cients on both auditor size variables are also positive and signi"cant at the 5% level or less, indicating that large auditors issue signi"cantly more modi"cations. The coe$cients on the auditor a$liation variables suggest that, relative to government-a$liated auditors, joint venture auditors tend to issue more modi"ed opinions, and that university-a$liated auditors (weakly) tend to issue fewer modi"ed opinions. The statistical signi"cance of the coe$cients on &Clients 53 Years Old,' &Return on Equity' and &Current Assets/Current Liabilities' is consistent with the univariate results in Table 3 . The dependent variable equals 1 if the audit opinion is modi"ed and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are de"ned as follows: After 1994 is a year dummy equal to 1 if the "scal year ends subsequent to 1994. Top 10 auditors (based on client's total assets) is a dummy equal to 1 if the auditor is a top 10 auditor based on combined client total assets that year, and zero otherwise.
University-a$liated auditor is an a$liation dummy and is equal to 1 if the audit "rm a$liated with a university or research institute, and zero otherwise.
Clients with foreign owners is a dummy equal to 1 if the "rm has foreign-owned shares outstanding.
Clients 53 years old is a dummy equal to 1 if the "rm has been listed for 3 years or more. Log of client assets equals the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. Return on equity is net income divided by year-end stockholders' equity. Total long-term debt/total equity is year-end total long-term debt divided by year-end total shareholders' equity.
Current asset/current liabilities is year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities.
Receivable/total assets is year-end accounts receivables divided by year-end total assets. Inventory/total assets is year-end inventory divided by year-end total assets. A complete set of "fteen industry dummies are included but not reported. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 1%. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 5%. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 10%.
Analysis of market concentration
Panel A of Table 5 presents univariate tests of our second hypothesis by comparing the audit market share of top 10 auditors before and after the adoption of the new auditing standards. Market share is measured as a percentage of total assets and total clients. The percentage of assets partially captures the costs or bene"ts to the auditor of a change in market share since audit fees are expected to be correlated with total assets (Simunic, 1980) . The percentage of assets also provides a measure of the impact on investors to the degree that assets capture the extent of ownership. The percentage of clients gives equal weight to each client, and thus captures client preferences independent of size. It also provides a measure of the impact on investors by capturing the pervasiveness of a change in market share. Thus, the two measures capture di!erent aspects of the economic e!ects of a change in market share. Information to compute audit market share is obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal electronic database. Auditor information on number of clients and audit "rm a$liation is collected from searching the Shanghai Securities News, Securities Times and China Securities. % of total Assets equals the total assets of the clients of the respective auditor group, divided by the total assets of all listed companies. % of total Clients equals the total number of clients of the respective auditor group, divided by the total number of listed companies.
The average number of clients is computed on a pooled basis and therefore does not always equal a simple average over the number of pooled periods. Two-tailed, statistical signi"cance level at 1% for a t-test of di!erences in means. Two-tailed, statistical signi"cance level at 5% for a t-test of di!erences in means. Two-tailed, statistical signi"cance level at 10% for a t-test of di!erences in means.
When subcontracting auditors act as representatives of top 10 auditors, the top 10 auditors sign the audit opinions. Thus, we expect controls within the top 10 auditors to be su$cient to ensure that the subcontractors exhibit a high level of independence. However, when the subcontractors receive their own licenses, they do not have the same incentives to maintain a high level of independence.
This results in dropping 13 clients from our analysis. While the a!ected clients could immediately switch back to a top 10 auditor after the new license is granted, voluntary auditor switches are expected to be especially costly in China. This is because relationships (quanxi) are very important in e!ectively transacting business, particularly regarding something as sensitive as the client's "nancial condition.
The average number of clients computed over time is calculated on a pooled basis and therefore does not always equal a simple average over the number of pooled periods.
Three tests are presented in panel A. The "rst test employs the entire sample of top 10 clients, the second test excludes all clients that switch to a newly entering auditor during the period analyzed, and the third test excludes all clients with foreign owned shares. Clients switching to new entrant auditors are dropped because the government often induces these switches. Each year the government grants licenses that allow existing audit "rms to audit listed companies. These licenses are often granted to small auditors whose clientele includes "rms that are subcontracted from top 10 auditors. When the small subcontractors are granted licenses, they typically inherit their subcontracted clients. Thus, granting new licenses can induce involuntary auditor switches from top 10 to non-top 10 auditors. Because this potentially confounds our results, we analyze the data after excluding all clients that switch to new entrant auditors for the 1993}1996 period.
We test the change in market share after excluding clients with foreign owners because Chen et al. (1999) report that the relative frequency of "rms issuing B-shares declines subsequent to 1994. Because companies issuing B-shares tend to choose larger auditors } particularly joint-venture auditors } the decline in Bshare issues may be correlated with the decline in market share of top 10 auditors.
Panel A indicates that the market share of the top 10 auditors, based on both assets and clients, is lower in the post-1994 period in all three samples. While we cannot compute a test statistic for the decline in total assets, the decline in clients is signi"cant at the 1% level in each test. This is consistent with our second hypothesis that predicts large auditors will lose market share subsequent to 1994. The decline in clients of 11% of the total market in the "rst two tests and 10% in the third test represents a loss of 22% or more of the pre-1995 average client base of 49%, 50% and 43%, for each of the respective samples.
Panel A also reports that the majority of the loss in market share occurs during 1996 in all three tests, with declines in assets ranging from 8% to 14% and declines in clients ranging from 9% to 12%. The large decline in 1996 may result from clients learning the e!ects of the new standards on auditor behavior during 1995. This is consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 2 , panel A, that reports an increase in modi"ed opinions from 1% to 10% during 1995, but
Reference to panel C of Table 1 indicates that the transient increase in market share among the top 10 joint venture auditors during 1994 and 1995 is explained by the inclusion of a third joint venture auditor among the top 10 during those years. a decline from 10% to 8% during 1996. Clients may observe that the new standards cause larger auditors to become more independent during 1995 and then avoid the top 10 auditors during 1996.
Panel B of Table 5 analyzes market share (based on total clients) partitioned on auditor size and a$liation. Due to the potential problems created by switches to new entrant auditors, only the sample excluding the switches to new entrants is analyzed. Panel B shows that the market share of the joint venture top 10 auditors is relatively constant across the periods analyzed, with 2% of the market in both 1993 and 1996. By contrast, both the government and university-a$liated top 10 auditors lose market share over the period 1993}1996. Thus, the joint venture auditors are the only top 10 a$liation to maintain their market share over this period. This is consistent with the large joint venture auditors providing a high level of independence even prior to the adoption of the new standards. This is likely due to the incentives provided by the large proportion of their clients with foreign ownership. At the end of 1996, 96% of the assets audited by the top 10 joint venture auditors belong to clients with foreign owners. This compares with a range of 9}41% among the other auditor size/a$liation categories. This large concentration of ownership by international investors provides an incentive for international joint venture partners to be independent in order to protect their reputation in the international capital markets.
Panel B also shows that the greatest bene"ciaries of the decline in top 10 market share are the non-top 10 government-a$liated auditors. Their market share grows from 41% in 1993 to 54% in 1996. The increased market share among these auditors may be due to client beliefs that their government a$liation and small size makes these auditors more susceptible to pressures to compromise their independence. That is, because most client "rms are majority owned by government entities, their government connections may give them a di!erential advantage in reducing the independence of the small governmenta$liated auditors. In addition, their close connections with local o$cials means that small government auditors are less likely to be pursued in court, which also reduces their incentives to act independently.
Analysis of auditor choice in the IPO market
The decline in market share among the large auditors could potentially be due to IPO clients choosing a higher proportion of smaller auditors, or to seasoned clients switching to smaller auditors. However, we only "nd a net of seven and two auditor switches between top 10 and non-top 10 auditors during 1995 and Table 6 IPO market share of top 10 and non-top 10 audit "rms Information relating to IPO data is obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal electronic database. % of total Assets equals the total assets of the clients of the respective auditor group, divided by the total assets of all listed companies. % of total Clients equals the total number of clients of the respective auditor group, divided by the total number of listed companies Two-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 1% for a t-test of di!erences in means. Two-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 5% for a t-test of di!erences in means. Two-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 10% for a t-test of di!erences in means.
462 IPOs are analyzed, consisting of 130, 101, 24, and 207 IPOs during 1993 130, 101, 24, and 207 IPOs during , 1994 130, 101, 24, and 207 IPOs during , 1995 130, 101, 24, and 207 IPOs during , and 1996 In contrast to auditor switches, there are many IPOs over the period analyzed. Panel A of Table 6 investigates changes in IPO client preferences by comparing the IPO market share of top 10 auditors before and after the adoption of the new standards. Two analyses are performed, one with the entire sample and one after excluding clients with foreign owners. As with the analysis in Table 5 , we exclude clients with foreign owners because Chen et al. (1999) "nd that there is a decline in new B-share issues after 1994 and B-share issues may be related to the demand for top 10 auditors. Panel A indicates that the top 10 auditors' market share drops in terms of both assets and clients subsequent to 1994 in both samples. While we cannot compute a test statistic for the decline in total assets, the decline in clients is signi"cant at the 1% level in each test. The 23% decline in clients in each sample represents a loss of over 50% of the pre-1995 average IPO client share of 41% and 38%, respectively in each sample. The incentives for IPO clients to reduce independence may be greater than for seasoned clients because the issuance price of IPO shares is a "xed multiple of accounting earnings.
Panel C of Table 1 reports that the number of non-top 10 auditors grows from 41 to 72 over the period 1993}1996. Thus, a potential explanation for the increase in IPO market share among the non-top 10 auditors is that newly entering non-top 10 auditors are capturing the majority of the IPO client However, even if the new entrant auditors were entirely responsible for capturing the increase in IPO market share, this is still consistent with a #ight to lower quality auditors because the new entrant auditors are non-top 10.
It is also possible that the shift in audit market concentration is due to institutional features in China such as cronyism and guanxi. However, we have no reason to believe that these potential explanations are spuriously correlated with our hypotheses. market. Panel B of Table 6 explores this possibility by reporting the IPO market share of the non-top 10 auditors after excluding these new entrant auditors. As with panel A, this analysis is also performed after excluding clients with foreign owners. Panel B reports that the continuing non-top 10 auditors capture an additional 17% of the IPO assets, and an additional 11% of the IPO clients after 1994. Excluding clients with foreign owners increases the proportion of assets to 21%, but does not a!ect the proportion of clients. The increase in clients is signi"cant at the 1% level in both samples. Panel B suggests that the continuing non-top 10 auditors capture most of the increase in non-top 10 market share in terms of assets } 17% and 21% of the 19% and 26% reported in the respective samples in panel A. However, they capture slightly less than half of the market share increase in terms of clients } 11% of the 23% reported in panel A for both samples. The larger share of assets compared to clients suggests that the continuing non-top 10 auditors capture relatively larger IPO clients and is consistent with them being relatively larger than the new entrant auditors. In conclusion, it does not appear that the decline in market share among the top 10 auditors is due primarily to new entrant non-top 10 auditors capturing IPO market share.
Panel C of Table 6 reports the top 10 auditors' share of the IPO market partitioned on total client assets. This panel reports that the top 10 auditors have maintained their market share among the very largest clients (those over RMB5000 million) but have lost market share in each of the other categories. Further, the smaller the client, generally speaking, the more precipitous the loss of market share. This is consistent with the largest clients continuing to choose top 10 auditors because smaller auditors are unable to service them.
Another potential explanation for new IPO clients selecting smaller auditors subsequent to 1994 is that the characteristics of IPO clients during those years are such that smaller auditors better suit their needs. A univariate comparison (not reported in a table) "nds that most variables expected to a!ect the choice of an IPO auditor, such as size and pro"tability, are insigni"cantly di!erent across the two groups of IPO clients. The current ratio and the ratios of inventory and accounts receivable to total assets are the only "nancial variables found to be signi"cantly di!erent across the two groups. Consistent with Chen et al. (1999) , we also "nd that the frequency of B-share IPOs is signi"cantly lower after 1994. Table 7 Logistic regression of auditor choice on IPO client characteristics 
t-stat.
Coe!.
Coe!. While audit fees may also impact auditor choice, audit fees are not publicly available. The dependent variable equals 1 if the auditor is one of the top 10 largest in terms of assets audited and 0 otherwise. The auditors with 55% of market dependent variable equals 1 if the auditor has a 55% market share based on client's total assets audited and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are de"ned as follows: After 1994 is a year dummy equal to 1 if the "scal year ends subsequent to 1994. Clients with foreign owners is a dummy equal to 1 if the "rm has foreign-owned shares outstanding. Log of client assets equals the natural logarithm of year-end total assets. Return on equity is net income divided by year-end stockholders' equity. Total long-term debt/total equity is year-end total long-term debt divided by year-end total shareholders' equity. Current asset/current liabilities is year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities. Receivable/total assets is year-end accounts receivables divided by year-end total assets. Inventory/total assets is year-end inventory divided by year-end total assets. A complete set of "fteen industry dummies are included but not reported. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 1%. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 5%. One-tailed statistical signi"cance level at 10%.
Intercept
To formally test whether di!erences in IPO characteristics are associated with the choice of auditor, Table 7 presents four logit models using the pooled data of all IPOs from 1994}1996. Our test examines all IPOs with su$cient data and consists of 230 IPOs issued during 1993 , and 229 IPOs issued during 1995 . Two of the models employ the full sample and two exclude clients with foreign owners. Within each of the two samples, the dependent variable is a dummy that captures auditor size by either membership among the largest 10 auditors or by market share of at least 5% of client assets. The independent variables consist of a dummy indicating whether the IPO occurs after 1994 and several control variables expected to be associated with auditor choice. Table 7 reports that the coe$cient on the post 1994 dummy is signi"cantly negative at the 1% level or less in each regression. This indicates that IPO clients are less likely to choose larger auditors subsequent to 1994, even after controlling for other factors expected to in#uence auditor choice. The results in the full sample regressions also report a signi"cant coe$cient on the foreign ownership dummy, and three of the four regressions report a signi"cant coe$cient on log of client assets. This is consistent with larger clients and clients Large auditors becoming more selective in accepting new clients could also potentially explain the &#ight from quality'. However, several factors make this possibility less appealing than our hypothesized reasons. First, the incentive for U.S. auditors to be selective in accepting (or retaining) clients is litigation concerns because issuing a modi"ed opinion does not protect auditors from litigation (Lys and Watts, 1994) . In China, the auditor can easily protect him/her self from regulatory scrutiny simply by issuing modi"ed reports to riskier clients. In addition, the magnitude of the drop in IPO market share of over 50% seems too high to be explained by auditors becoming more selective in accepting clients.
with foreign owners having auditing needs that can only be met by larger auditors.
Robustness checks
Inclusion of scope limitation modixcations
As explained in Section 3.1, the sample "rms classi"ed as receiving modi"ed audit reports omit 16 "rms that are expected to be neutral. Since judgement is used in making this classi"cation, we rerun our tests of hypothesis one after including these "rms. The results are insensitive to using the full sample of modi"ed opinions. Speci"cally, replication of Table 2 , panel A "nds that the frequency of modi"ed opinions increases subsequent to 1994 (signi"cant at the 1% level) and replication of Table 4 "nds that the coe$cients on the &after 1994' and auditor size variables continue to be positive and signi"cant at the 1% level.
First time modixcations
Prior researchers often limit their analysis of audit opinion modi"cations to "rst time modi"cations (Dopuch et al., 1987) . Therefore, we rerun our multivariate analysis in Table 4 after dropping 12 observations that are not "rst time modi"cations. The &after 1994' dummy remains signi"cant at the 1% level and the top 10 largest auditors and auditors with at least 5% market share, are signi"cant at the 11% and 1% levels, respectively.
Capital market variables
To control for potentially omitted correlated variables, we rerun our multivariate analysis in Table 4 after including annual share price variability, Scholes and Williams betas, and cumulative stock returns in the regression. While we lose 20% of the observations due to data limitation, the coe$cient on the &after 1994' dummy remains signi"cant at the 1% level, and none of these additional variables are statistically signi"cant. The two auditor size variables, the top 10 largest auditors and auditors with at least 5% market share, are signi"cant at the 13% and 1% levels, respectively.
Alternative age measures
Our measure of client age in Table 4 is a dummy for clients that are three or more years old. As a robustness check, we replicate Table 4 analysis measuring age as two or more years, four or more years, and as a continuous variable. The results indicate that the coe$cients on the age dummy and the &after 1994' variable continue to be positive and signi"cant at the 1% level in each regression. The coe$cient on auditor size measured as at least 5% of market share also remains positive and signi"cant at the 1% level in all three regressions. The coe$cient on auditor size measured as top 10 is positive and signi"cant at the 5% level using the dummy variables and at the 12% level using the continuous variable.
Interaction terms
We "nd that larger Chinese auditors are relatively more independent than smaller auditors, and that the new auditing standards increase the frequency of modi"ed opinions. However, the new standards may have had a di!erential e!ect on larger auditors compared to smaller auditors. We explore this by rerunning the regression in Table 4 after including a variable that interacts the auditor size and &after 1994' variables. The results "nd that the interaction term is not signi"cant at conventional levels in either regression. Further, while the coe$cients on the &after 1994' variable continues to be signi"cant at the 5% level, the coe$cient on auditor size } when measured as 5% or more of market share } is no longer signi"cant at conventional levels. The coe$cient on auditor size measured as a top 10 auditor remains signi"cant at the 10% level. The lack of signi"cance of the interaction term suggests that the relation between auditor size and modi"cations is not statistically di!erent across the pre-and post-1994 time periods. In other words, the statistical relation shifted after 1994, but did not &pivot'. However, this "nding is not problematic because we do not hypothesize a di!erential reaction and such a di!erence is not necessary in formulating our hypotheses. The lack of signi"cance of one of our size variables may be due to the high Spearman correlation between size and the interaction term of 0.65.
Alternative measures of auditor size
Because our analysis spans four years, our measure of top 10 auditors does not include the same 10 auditors each year. Therefore, we rerun our tests with large auditors de"ned as the seven auditors that are consistently among the top 10 in each year of our analysis. The results indicate our conclusions are insensitive to this alternative de"nition. Speci"cally, replication of the analysis in Table 5 , panel A indicates that the decline in client market share subsequent to 1994 is signi"cant at the 2% level or less in each test. In addition, replication of Table 4 indicates the &after 1994' variable remains signi"cant at the 1% level and this alternative auditor size variable is signi"cant at the 1% level.
In addition, while our univariate tests (in Tables 2, 5 and 6) de"ne auditor size as the largest 10 auditors, our multivariate tests (Tables 4 and 7 ) also include size de"ned as auditors with at least a 5% market share. Therefore, we replicate our univariate analyses using this alternative measure. The results indicate our conclusions are invariant to our auditor size measure. Speci"cally, replication of Table 2 , panel B "nds larger auditors issue an average of 3% more modi"cations (signi"cant at the 5% level). Replication of Table 5 , panel A indicates that large auditors lose 14}17% market share of total clients after 1994 (signi"cant at the 1% level). Replication of Table 6 , panel A "nds that large auditors lose 22}23% of the IPO market share of total clients subsequent to 1994 (signi"cant at the 1% level). Replication of Table 6 , panel B indicates that small auditors gain 12}13% of the IPO market share of total clients subsequent to 1994 (signi"cant at the 1% level).
Geographic location of IPO clients
A potentially confounding factor in our auditor concentration analysis is that some IPOs could possibly occur in cities where clients do not have a choice between top 10 and non-top 10 auditors. This could result in auditor choice being dominated by the additional audit costs associated with using the services of a non-local auditor. We investigate this issue by rerunning our IPO analysis after including only clients that are headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. These locales are chosen because they are large metropolitan areas where clients can clearly choose between top 10 and non-top 10 auditors. Replicating our Table 6 analysis using this reduced sample "nds that the average market share of clients by top 10 auditors during 1993 and 1994 is 78%, and declines to 48% during 1995 and 1996. The 30% di!erence is signi"cant at the 2% level. Replicating the analysis in Table 7 using this reduced sample "nds that the &after 1994' dummy remains signi"cant in both regressions at the 10% level or less. Thus, it does not appear that the geographic location of the IPO clients confound our results.
Joint venture auditors
The analyses in Tables 5 and 6 are performed after dropping clients with foreign owners. This is done because Chen et al. (1999) report a decline in B-share IPOs subsequent to 1994 and the demand for B-share auditors may impact the market share of large auditors. Since joint venture auditors audit most B-share "nancial reports, we also replicate the analysis in Tables 5 and 6 after dropping all joint venture auditors from the sample. The results indicate our conclusions are una!ected by dropping the joint venture auditors. Speci"cally, the replicated results in Table 5 , panel A indicate that top 10 auditors lose 11}12% of the market share of total clients (signi"cant at the 1% level) subsequent to 1994. The replicated results in Table 6 , panel A indicate that top 10 auditors lose 24% of the IPO market share of total clients (signi"cant at the 1% level) subsequent to 1994. The replicated results in Table 6 , panel B indicate that non-top 10 auditors gain 12% of the IPO market share of total clients (signi"cant at the 1% level) subsequent to 1994.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the e!ects of implementing rigorous new auditing standards in China. We hypothesize that the adoption of the new auditing standards, in the presence of costly penalties for non-compliance, provide an incentive for auditors to become more independent. Our surrogate for independence is the relative frequency with which auditors issue modi"ed audit reports. We also believe that the increased complexity in the reporting environment due to the promulgation of new reporting regulations increase the probability of misreporting and hence modi"ed opinions. Since larger auditors have more to lose if they are found to be in violation of auditing standards, we expect larger auditors to be relatively more independent than smaller auditors. In addition, we note that there are few institutional features in the Chinese economy that provide incentives for management to demand independent auditors, and strong incentives to avoid the receipt of modi"ed opinions. Thus, we also hypothesize that managers will tend to choose smaller auditors subsequent to the adoption of the new standards in order to reduce their chances of receiving a modi"ed audit report.
Our results support our predictions. We "nd that the relative frequency of modi"ed audit reports increases from an average of 1% prior to the adoption of the new standards, to 9% subsequent to the adoption of the new standards. This result is supported in both univariate tests and in multivariate tests that control for other factors that may impact the auditor's decision to modify. We also "nd that larger auditors lose market share subsequent to the adoption of the new auditing standards. Further analysis indicates that this decline is explained by a decline in the market share of IPO clients. Thus, our results suggest that there is a &#ight from quality' in the Chinese audit market in response to the adoption of the new auditing standards.
Appendix A. Examples of modi5ed audit reports that suggest management may be engaged in manipulating earnings
A.1. Changes in accounting estimates
Company: Guangdong Shaoneng Auditor: Guangzhou, top 10 auditor in 1996 Stock exchange: Shenzhen Audit opinion for 1996: quali"ed with explanatory paragraph Guangdong Shaoneng was listed in Shenzhen in August 1996. On June 1, 1996, the Shaoneng changed the useful lives of several of its categories of depreciable assets. O$ce buildings were changed from 20 to 40 years, factory buildings were changed from 20 to 30 years, machinery was changed from 10 to 20 years, and transportation equipment was changed from 5 to 10 years. These changes in estimates increased the 1996 net income of Shaoneng by RMB 10.7 million. Without this increase, the ROE for 1996 would have been 9.12%, just below the 10% cuto! requirement for issuing additional shares. The change in estimates increased its ROE to 10.70%, allowing the "rm to have rights issue if it continues to maintain a 10% ROE for the next two years.
A.2. Scope limitation
Company: Huanghe Machinery Auditor: Xian Stock exchange: Shanghai Audit opinion for 1995 and 1996: quali"ed opinion with explanatory paragraph In 1995 Huanghe sold its products across 24 regions in China. Due to the vast distance and its audit "rm's limited resources, it's audit "rm did not properly audit the company's RMB 75 million of inventory and RMB 31.44 million of trade receivables. The 1996 scope limitation was related to the above two items plus the following the fact that the company failed to provide relevant information to allow the auditors to audit a RMB 21million long-term investment.
A.3. Related party transactions
Company: Shanghai Shenhua Auditor: Dahua, top 10 auditor in 93}96 Stock exchange: Shanghai Audit opinion for 1995: quali"ed opinion with explanatory paragraph In 1995, Shenhua sold three million shares of Dazhong Taxi at RMB 3.354 million (1.118 yuan a share) to Shanghai Jianguo Charitable Trust Fund with recourse. The sales agreement stipulated that if the institutional shares were not listed in the stock exchange within two years, Shenhua would buy back all the shares at the same price plus 15% interest. Without recognizing this sale of RMB 3.354 million yuan, Shenhua's ROE would have dropped below 10%. Shenhua's auditor, Dahua, argued that this transaction should not have been recognized as a sale, but rather a loan. The Shanghai Jianguo Charitable Trust Fund was named after Shenhua's CEO Jianguo Qu and this should have been considered a related-party transaction. The government later ruled that no institutional shares were allowed to be listed in the stock exchanges. Also, Shenhua enjoyed a below market interest rate of 15% over two years, while the market rate for a comparable bank loan was 13% a year.
Appendix B
Market share of each top 10 auditor is given in Table 8 . Table 8 Market share of each top 10 auditor Name The market share of each audit "rm is de"ned as the combined client total assets of the audit "rm divided by the combined total assets of all listed companies in the market. The top 10 auditors are in bold print.
